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Election Timing - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Smith, Alastair (New York University)
Election Timing - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Smith, Alastair (New York University)
The author proposes an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. He explains why leaders find it difficult to profit from their ability to call elections when they are popular and the opposition is weak.
286 pages, 35 b/w illus. 21 tables
| Media | Books Hardcover Book (Book with hard spine and cover) |
| Released | July 19, 2004 |
| ISBN13 | 9780521833639 |
| Publishers | Cambridge University Press |
| Pages | 286 |
| Dimensions | 161 × 237 × 24 mm · 576 g |
| Language | English |
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