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Delegation and Agency in International Organizations - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Darren G Hawkins
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations - Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Darren G Hawkins
Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.
428 pages, 23 tables
| Media | Books Hardcover Book (Book with hard spine and cover) |
| Released | September 14, 2006 |
| ISBN13 | 9780521862097 |
| Publishers | Cambridge University Press |
| Pages | 428 |
| Dimensions | 237 × 160 × 34 mm · 790 g |
| Language | English |
| Editor | Hawkins, Darren G. (Brigham Young University, Utah) |
| Editor | Lake, David A. (University of California, San Diego) |
| Editor | Nielson, Daniel L. (Brigham Young University, Utah) |
| Editor | Tierney, Michael J. (College of William and Mary, Virginia) |