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Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations Peter D. Feaver
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
Peter D. Feaver
How do civilians control the military? In his book, Feaver proposes a new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the “armed servants” of the nation-state.
400 pages, 38 line illustrations, 15 tables
| Media | Books Paperback Book (Book with soft cover and glued back) |
| Released | March 15, 2005 |
| ISBN13 | 9780674017610 |
| Publishers | Harvard University Press |
| Pages | 400 |
| Dimensions | 150 × 228 × 26 mm · 560 g |
| Language | English |
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