E.J. Coffman

Luck: Its Nature and Significance for Human Knowledge and Agency - Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy E.J. Coffman

Marc Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index. Table of Contents: Contents1 Lucky Events: The Current Debate and a New Proposal1.1 Three Leading Theories of Luck1.2 Counterexamples to the Leading Theories of Luck1.3 Lucky Events and Strokes of Luck1.4 The Strokes Account: Further Support and Defense 2 What is a Stroke of Luck?: Enriching the Strokes Account2.1 Initial Statement of the Analysis and Some Important Implications2.2 The Analysis: Revisions and Defense2.3 Putting it All Together: the Enriched Strokes Account of Lucky Events2.4 How the Enriched Strokes Account Handles the Counterexamples to the Literature's Leading Theories of Luck 3 Knowledge and Luck I: Gettiered Belief and the Ease of Mistake Approach3.1 An Initial Catalog of Kinds of Epistemic Luck3.2 Pritchard on Evidence Luck and Belief Luck3.3 The Scope of Gettiered Belief3.4 The Ease of Mistake Approach to Gettiered Belief: Explanation and Support3.5 Counterexamples to the Ease of Mistake Approach 4 Knowledge and Luck II: Three More Approaches to Gettiered Belief4.1 From Ease of Mistake to Lack of Credit4.2 Creditability as Explanatory Salience4.3 Creditability as Power Manifestation4.4 Two Riskier Approaches to Gettiered Belief4.5 The Risk of Misleading Dispositions Approach to Gettiered Belief4.6 The Risk of Misleading Justification Approach to Gettiered Belief4.6.1 Objection 1: Kelp's Demonic Clock4.6.2 Objection 2: Bogardus's Atomic Clock 5 Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck I: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility and Literal Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement5.1 Defending the Possibility of Morally Responsible Action5.2 Four Different Kinds of Luck-Involving Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement5.3 Literal Versions of the Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement5.3.1 An Intriguing Attempted Counterexample to (IA-2)5.3.2 Against the 'at least partly a matter of luck' Readings of (DA-2) and (IA-2)5.3.3 Against (DA/IA-1) 6 Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck II: Stipulative Arguments for the ProximalDetermination Requirement and Three Arguments against It6.1 Stipulative Versions of the Direct Argument for the Proximal Determination Requirement6.2 Stipulative Versions of the Indirect Argument for the Proximal Determination Requirement6.2.1 Five Arguments for (MI-2)6.3 Three Arguments against the Proximal Determination Requirement6.3.1 Objections to the Melean Argument6.3.2 Objections to Fischer's Argument6.3.3 Defending the Possibility Argument Coda Biographical Note: E. J. Coffman is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, USA. He works primarily in epistemology and philosophy of action. He has recently published papers in these areas in Philosophical Issues, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophers' Imprint, Philosophical Studies, Synthese, Philosophical Explorations, and Journal of Philosophical Research.