Christian Funke

Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Capital Structure - An Empirical Study of DAX Companies Christian Funke

Diploma Thesis aus dem Jahr 2003 im Fachbereich Wirtschaft - Investition und Finanzierung, Note: 1,1 (A), European Business School - Internationale Universität Schloß Reichartshausen Oestrich-Winkel (Endowed-Chairf for Corporate Finance and Capital Markets), Sprache: Englisch, Anmerkungen: Empirical diploma thesis using a multivariate regression approach to determine the influence of ownership structures on observed variations in capital structure. A discussion of the theoretical background takes up about 20 pages, and 40 pages are then dedicated to the development of the regression model, discussion of the results and robustness tests. The text part is 63 pages long, the rest is a detailed appendix with 18 exhibits, as well as a bibliography with 160 sources. , Abstract: The idea that the general characteristics of a firm's ownership structure can affect performance has achieved considerable attention and related research brought forward relatively consistent empirical evidence e.g. on the positive impact of managerial ownership on firm performance. However, the evidence on the relation between ownership and capital structure is less consistent and numerous, although there are good reasons to believe that there may be such a relationship. Since the capital structure irrelevance propositions of MODIGLIANI/MILLER economists have devoted considerable time to studying cross-sectional and time-series variations in capital structure. More recent work following the seminal contribution by JENSEN/MECKLING has employed an agency theory perspective in the search for an explanation of capital structure variations. With this managerial perspective capital structure is not only explained by variations in internal and external contextual factors of the firm, but also by the values, goals, preferences and desires of managers. Corporate financing decisions are influenced by managers' incentives and the incentives for managers to act opportunistically can be influenced by t